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1 Introduction
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 gave rise to a renewed interest in the usefulness
of fiscal purchases for spurring a recovery. Attention to that issue has been signif-
icantly increased by the fact that in many countries the alternative stabilization
tool (i.e., monetary policy) was constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates. A natural question that emerged concerned the effectiveness of fis-
cal expenditures in comparison to other government policy measures that could
be used to stimulate economic activity.
As pointed by Woodford (2011), much public discussion of this issue had been
based on old-fashioned models that ignored the role of intertemporal optimiza-
tion and expectations. To address this shortcoming, Woodford (2011) used the
standard New Keynesian model to explain the key determinants of the govern-
ment spending multiplier by providing a series of examples that can be solved
analytically. His analysis, however, was conducted under a simplifying assump-
tion that households populating the model are identical. This condition seems
to be overly restrictive because, as the standard textbook Keynesian-cross logic
suggests, multiplier’s value depends on the feedback loop between income and
aggregate consumption. Properties of the latter, in turn, are heavily affected by
household heterogeneity (as documented by Carroll et al. (2014), Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2014), Kaplan and Violante (2014), Krueger et al. (2016) among others).
Motivated by this observation, my paper seeks to relax the assumption about
representative household when analyzing the macroeconomic impact of a rise in
government purchases and, by providing an analytical formula for the multiplier,
to obtain insights about determinants of fiscal policy effectiveness.
More specifically, I calculate a closed-form expression for the fiscal expendi-
ture multiplier in environment where agents are heterogeneous with respect to
income and wealth. To derive this formula, I use the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari
model extended to capture a decentralized product market featuring search fric-
tions. This departure from the standard framework allows to relax several as-
sumptions that were used in the literature to obtain analytical expressions in the
Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models, such as: i) extreme illiquidity that eliminates
wealth heterogeneity (e.g. Krusell et al. (2011), Werning (2015), Ravn and Sterk
(2016), McKay and Reis (2016a)), ii) constant real interest rates or constant prices
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of goods (e.g., Auclert et al. (2018), Patterson (2018)), iii) partial equilibrium anal-
ysis (e.g. Auclert (2017)). In other words, the non-Walrasian formulation of the
product market allows to derive an explicit formula for the multiplier in economy
that features household heterogeneity with respect to income and wealth, where
monetary authority conducts policy using a realistic, Taylor-type rule that affects
real interest rates and all general equilibrium effects are taken into account. To
my knowledge, this is the first analytical result of this type in the literature.
Frictional product market allows to abstract from assumptions i), ii) and iii)
because it enables to summarize all endogenous general equilibrium effects that
are taken as given by households in terms of only one variable: product mar-
ket tightness. This feature turns out to be crucial when computing the reaction
of aggregate consumption to change in government spending. Except for that,
the assumption about non-Walrasian product market allows to incorporate price-
setting mechanisms featuring various levels of price rigidity in a tractable way.
The derived formula for the multiplier depends on distributions of: marginal
propensities to consume (henceforth MPC), consumption, income and wealth
across households, parameters of the monetary policy rule, parameter describ-
ing the comovement of output and prices resulting from a demand shock, ag-
gregate public debt, cross-sectional tax burdens, parameter of the fiscal rule that
pins down the way in which additional government purchases are financed and
a forward-looking component that captures changes in consumer expectations
resulting from the government expenditures shock.
I calibrate the model to match aggregate moments characterizing Italian econ-
omy, and most crucially, average MPC of Italian households documented in the
SHIW survey. To this end, I follow Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) and I construct
two alternative specifications of the model that enable to mimic a relatively high
level of mean MPC observed in the data. First of them assumes that a propor-
tion of households behave like rule-of-thumb consumers. Second version of the
model is populated by two groups of consumers with different levels of discount
factor (the so-called patient and impatient households). I argue that the latter
variant of the model fails to mimic the distributional features of MPC and thus
may lead to some erroneous conclusions concerning the impact of fiscal policy.
First version, however, circumvents this problem and it is used to evaluate the
components of the derived multiplier’s formula under several scenarios associ-
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ated with different variants of fiscal and monetary policy.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it is associated
with works studying the effects of fiscal policy shocks in models with heteroge-
neous households, in which a significant proportion of agents deviates from the
consumption-savings behavior predicted by the permanent income hypothesis
and thus exhibits relatively high levels of MPC. There are two main groups of
papers within that field: first of them focuses on the role of taxes and transfers
(e.g., Oh and Reis (2012), McKay and Reis (2016b), Den Haan et al. (2015)), and
the second concentrates on the role of fiscal purchases (e.g., Challe and Ragot
(2011), Brinca et al. (2017), Navarro and Ferriere (2016), Hagedorn et al. (2017)
and Auclert et al. (2018)). It seems that the closest work to mine is the last one, in
which Auclert et al. (2018) characterize analytically the fiscal multiplier using the
so-called intertemporal MPCs. Auclert et al. (2018) conduct their analysis under
the assumption that monetary policy keeps real interest rates at a constant level.
In my paper, I relax this restriction by considering a more general, Taylor-type
monetary policy rule.
As already mentioned, the key ingredient in my analysis is frictional product
market. The presence of a non-Walrasian market for goods in the model can be
motivated by the fact that in reality this market functions in a decentralized man-
ner and features frictions (see Michaillat and Saez (2015)). This formulation goes
back to a seminal paper by Diamond (1982) who proposed a model with search
frictions in the market for goods that is subject to the so-called thick market ex-
ternality. More recently, frictional product markets were used, among others, in
works by Michaillat and Saez (2015), Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015), Ka-
plan and Menzio (2016), Storesletten et al. (2017) and Michaillat and Saez (2018).
My paper is tightly related to the last two. First, as Storesletten et al. (2017), I for-
malize search costs in terms of disutilty from search effort. Second, similarly to
Michaillat and Saez (2018), I study the effects of higher fiscal purchases. The most
important difference with respect to Michaillat and Saez (2018) is that I consider
a model with heterogeneous agents.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari model with frictional product market. In Section 3
I derive the analytical formula for the multiplier. Section 4 applies the formula
the calibrated model to estimate the magnitude of channels under two alternative
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scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Time is infinite and divided into discrete periods and, to keep the notation simple,
for now I concentrate on the stationary equilibrium of the model. The assump-
tion about stationarity is relaxed in Section 2.7. There are two types of agents in
the economy: heterogeneous, self-employed households and government that is
composed of two branches: central bank and fiscal authority. There are two mar-
kets: first of them is a Walrasian market where households trade liquid assets b˜
and the second is the market for consumption goods traded at price p, which is
decentralized and features search frictions analogous to those from the standard
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of labor market. By b I denote the value
of nominal assets b˜ divided by the price of consumption goods in the previous
period.
2.2 Households
The model is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households of measure
one. Households are both consumers and producers at the same time and they
manufacture consumption goods using the following technology:
z · f
where z is an idiosyncratic shock and by f I denote the probability that a unit of
good supplied by a household is sold. To put it differently, f can be thought of as
capacity utilization. Randomness at the individual level is excluded so f is equal
across households. Idiosyncratic shock z follows a Markovian process defined
on space Z and it can be interpreted as household’s production capacity. By µ I
denote the distribution of agents over liquid asset holdings b and shock z.
Similarly to Storesletten et al. (2017), agent preferences are given by the instan-
taneous utility function u˜ (c, v) where u˜c > 0, u˜v < 0, u˜cc < 0, c is consumption
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and v is search effort exerted by household. Alternatively, v can be seen as a
number of visits made by household to purchase goods from other consumers.
Values of c and v are related by the following constraint imposed by product
market frictions:
c = q · v (2.1)
where q is the probability with which a visit that is made by household is success-
ful, i.e., it ends with a purchase of a unit of consumption good. Both f and q are
endogenous and are determined in equilibrium. Similarly to Diamond (1982),
I assume that households cannot consume their own output and they have to
search for goods manufactured by others.
Household pays income tax T (z) that depends on its productivity level z. Liq-
uid assets earn nominal interest rate i that is set by monetary authority. House-
hold’s choice of next period nominal balances b′ is subject to the borrowing con-
straint:
b′ ≥ −ξ
where ξ is a positive constant. To complete the description of household’s envi-
ronment, let us denote by Π the ratio between current price p and its level in the
previous period.
The maximization problem of household with real value of liquid balances b
and productivity level z can be represented by the following Bellman equation:
V (b, z) = max
c, v, b′
{
u˜(c, v) + βEz′|zV
(
b′, z′
)}
(2.2)
subject to:
c + T (z) +
b′
1+ i
=
b
Π
+ z · f
c = q · v
b′ ≥ −ξ
where V is value function associated with the dynamic problem of agent. House-
hold discounts future utility streams with factor β ∈ (0, 1). Consumer optimizes
with respect to: budget constraint, product market frictions constraint and liq-
uidity constraint. The resulting policy functions are c (b, z), v (b, z) and b′ (b, z).
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Finally, let us define:
B = [−ξ,+∞)
which is a space to which asset holdings b and asset choices b′ belong.
2.3 Government
Government consists of fiscal authority and central bank. Fiscal authority pur-
chases consumption goods G and, since (similarly to households) it operates un-
der product market frictions, its expenditures are subject to the following con-
straint:
G = q · vG (2.3)
where vG is the number of visits made by government. Government collects taxes
and issues bonds B¯′ to finance purchases G and repayment of debt B¯ issued in the
previous period. Consequently, government budget constraint reads:
∫
B×Z
T (z) dµ (b, z) +
B¯′
1+ i
=
B¯
Π
+ G. (2.4)
Monetary authority follows a standard Taylor-type rule that depends on devi-
ations: of aggregate output Y and price index Π from their levels in stationary
equilibrium (denoted by Y¯ and Π¯, respectively):1
i = i¯ + φY ·
(
Y− Y¯
Y¯
)
+ φΠ · (Π− Π¯)
where i¯, φY and φΠ are positive parameters.
2.4 Matching technology and price-setting
It is assumed that the number of successful matches in the product market is gov-
erned by a constant returns to scale matching function M that increases in both
arguments and depends on the aggregate number of visits made by households
1There is a slight abuse of notation here because I denote the stationary equilibrium values of
Y and Π with bars in this part of the paper and I suppress this notational element later.
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and government and on the aggregate output capacity:
M
(∫
B×Z
v (b, z) dµ (b, z) + vG,
∫
B×Z
zdµ (b, z)
)
.
Product market tightness x is given by the ratio between aggregate visits and
total production capacity:
x ≡
∫
B×Z v (b, z) dµ (b, z) + vG∫
B×Z zdµ (b, z)
. (2.5)
Since there is no universal theory that would pin down prices in a decentralized
market that features search frictions I will assume that price index Π is a strictly
increasing function of x:
Π = Π(x), Π′ (x) > 0. (2.6)
The assumed relationship relies on the following intuition: price level increases
when the ratio between aggregate demand (captured by the aggregate number
of visits) and aggregate production capacity (captured by
∫
zdµ) rises. In other
words, Π tends to react positively to demand shocks and negatively to supply
shocks. This simple formulation of the price-setting mechanism allows to con-
sider various degrees of price stickiness, which is described by the value of Π′.
2.5 Consistency conditions and market clearing
Probabilities f and q are induced by matching technology M and due to the as-
sumed constant returns to scale they can be expressed as functions of only one
argument - x:
f (x) =
M
(∫
B×Z v (b, z) dµ (b, z) + vG,
∫
B×Z zdµ (b, z)
)
∫
B×Z zdµ (b, z)
= M (x, 1) (2.7)
q (x) =
M
(∫
B×Z v (b, z) dµ (b, z) + vG,
∫
B×Z zdµ (b, z)
)
∫
B×Z v (b, z) dµ (b, z) + vG
= M
(
1,
1
x
)
(2.8)
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The market clearing condition for nominal assets reads:
B¯′ =
∫
B×Z
b′ (b, z) dµ (b, z) (2.9)
and the resource constraint for consumption goods is:∫
B×Z
c (b, z) dµ (b, z) + G = f (x) ·
∫
B×Z
zdµ (b, z) (2.10)
where the right hand side is defined as aggregate output Y:
Y (x) ≡ f (x) ·
∫
B×Z
zdµ (b, z) . (2.11)
Observe that aggregate product is demand-driven as aggregate capacity
∫
zdµ is
fixed and therefore Y depends solely on the probability with which consumers
arrive to other households and purchase goods. This is a significant departure
from the neoclassical paradigm under which output depends solely on produc-
tion factors like capital and labor. This assumption, made by Michaillat and Saez
(2015) and Storesletten et al. (2017) among others, allows me to isolate the inter-
play between inequality, aggregate demand and fiscal policy effectiveness from
the behavior of the supply-side.
Evolution of the distribution of agents across asset holdings b and shocks z is
described by the following equation:
µ′
(B′, z′) = ∫
{b:b′(b,z)∈B′}×Z
P(z′|z)dµ(b, z) (2.12)
where B′ is a Borel subset of [−ξ,+∞) and P(z′|z) is transition probability be-
tween states z and z′. Equation 2.12 defines the law of motion for the distribution
of agents and the associated operator Γ:
µ′ = Γ (µ) . (2.13)
Finally, I assume the following standardization:∫
B×Z
zdµ (b, z) = 1 (2.14)
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i.e., the average productivity z across agents is equal to one.
2.6 Stationary equilibrium
We are in position to define the stationary equilibrium of the model:
Definition. A stationary equilibrium is: positive numbers x, q, f , i, value function V,
policy functions c, v, b′, distribution µ such that given B¯, G, vG, Π and T:
1. Given f , q, i, Π and T function V solves household’s maximization problem 2.2
and c, v and b′ are associated policy functions.
2. Given B¯, G, Π, vG, q and i equation 2.3 and government budget constraint 2.4
hold.
3. Consistency conditions 2.5, 2.7, 2.8, price-setting relationship 2.6 and resource
constraints 2.9, 2.10 are satisfied.
4. Measure µ is a fixed point of operator Γ defined by 2.12 and 2.13.
2.7 Household maximization problem expressed in terms of mar-
ket tightness x and government purchases G
In what follows I argue that all aggregate objects that are taken as given by house-
holds while solving problem 2.2 in period when aggregate shock to fiscal pur-
chases arrives can be expressed as functions of product market tightness x or
government purchases G (or both). This feature is crucial when deriving the
closed-form expression for the government spending multiplier as it will allow
to summarize all general equilibrium effects that affect consumer decisions with
only one endogenous variable: x.
Let us start with the consistency condition 2.7 which implies that rate f is
simply a function of x. Notice that since equation 2.14 holds we can express
output as a function of x because by 2.11 it simply equals f :
Y (x) = f (x). (2.15)
Combining this with the assumption about price formation (equation 2.6) allows
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to express central bank policy rate i as:
i (x) = i¯ + φY ·
(
Y (x)− Y¯
Y¯
)
+ φΠ · (Π (x)− Π¯) .
Observe that since Π′ (x) > 0 (see condition 2.6) and f ′ (x) > 0 (by 2.7 and
because M increases in its arguments), function i (x) is strictly increasing:
i′ (x) ≥ 0. (2.16)
Tax T (z) paid by household with productivity z can be decomposed into two
parts: aggregate tax revenue of government Θ and individual’s share τ (z) in the
aggregate tax burden:
T (z) ≡ τ (z) ·Θ (2.17)
where τ (z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ Z are time-invariant and they satisfy:2∫
B×Z
τ (z) dµ (b, z) = 1.
This obviously means that government’s tax income reads:∫
B×Z
T (z) dµ (b, z) = Θ.
I use constraint that relates consumption c and visits v to eliminate the latter from
the maximization problem 2.2:
v =
c
q (x)
where the relationship between q and x follows from condition 2.8.
Finally, since our main focus is the effect of an aggregate shock to govern-
ment purchases we have to depart from the assumption about stationary alloca-
tion. This, in turn, implies that variables and value functions in the maximization
problem become time-dependent. More specifically, it will be assumed that at
the beginning of period t economy is in stationary equilibrium and right after-
2Navarro and Ferriere (2016) consider the case in which fiscal stimulus is accompanied by a
rise in the progressivity of income tax (i.e., τ < 0 for agents with lowest earnings). By imposing
the restriction that τ ≥ 0, I exclude the possibility of such additional implicit transfers to isolate
the sole impact of government purchases.
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wards (but still in period t) there is an unexpected rise in fiscal expenditures that
jump from the stationary equilibrium level G to Gt. Period t is also referred to as
“today”.
In what follows, I consider fiscal interventions that can be described by the
following rule Λ:
Λ : Gt →
[{Gs (Gt)}s≥t , {B¯s+1 (Gt)}s≥t] (2.18)
which captures both stimulus persistence (path {Gs (Gt)}s≥t) and it specifies the
way in which stimulus is financed (path {B¯s+1 (Gt)}s≥t).3 Moreover, it is as-
sumed that mapping Λ is smooth.4
Let us discuss formula 2.18 in a more detailed way. The presence of the se-
quence of functions {Gs (Gt)}s≥t in the specification of fiscal rule Λ can be inter-
preted in the following way: future levels of fiscal spending are announced in
period t and are pinned down by the size of Gt. In fact, this assumption is very
common in the literature: to see that, notice that it nests both a one-time shock,
a permanent shock and an autoregressive shock that returns back to stationary
equilibrium level G as s→ +∞ as special cases.
Additionally, formula 2.18 says that together with path of fiscal purchases
{Gs (Gt)}s>t government announces the path of real public debt {B¯s+1 (Gt)}s≥t.
From now on, I assume that the sequence of functions {B¯s+1 (Gt)}s≥t satisfies two
conditions. First, it is required that:
∀s≥t dB¯s+1dGt ≥ 0, (2.19)
i.e., the rise in fiscal purchases cannot be accompanied with a reduction in public
debt on the transition path. This condition imposes a consistency on the fiscal
rule Λ as it excludes the coexistence of expansionary government spending with
public debt austerity.
Second, it is assumed that {B¯s+1 (Gt)}s≥t is such that the implied path of ag-
3As we shall see later, the path of taxes will be induced by paths {Gs (Gt)}s>t and
{B¯s+1 (Gt)}s≥t so it is not necessary to report it when discussing the way in which government
purchases are financed.
4This condition is imposed to guarantee that the forward-looking component in the multi-
plier’s formula is well-defined.
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gregate tax burdens (which are specified later with formulas 2.21 and 2.22) satis-
fies:
∀s≥t dΘsdGt ≥ 0, (2.20)
i.e., the increase of debt during fiscal expansion has an upper limit that prevents
from reductions in taxes during expansion. This is required to eliminate the pos-
sibility that a rise in G is accompanied with a drop in tax burden (which is equiv-
alent to rise in aggregate transfers). It is imposed because the main object of
interest in this paper is fiscal spending multiplier and therefore I want to isolate
the impact of government purchases from other types of stimulative fiscal poli-
cies (like transfers). In particular, as it is shown in the proof of Theorem, for s = t
(the period when expansion begins) bounds 2.19 and 2.20 imply:
dB¯t+1
dGt
∈ [0, 1+ i¯] .
Finally, given Λ, one can define:
λ ≡ dB¯t+1
dGt
which will be useful later. The size of λ can be interpreted as a proportion of a rise
in government purchases that is financed with the issuance of additional debt in
period t when government applies rule Λ.
From what has been said above, given Λ, the budget income from taxes in
periods s > t can be expressed as a function of product market tightness xs and
government purchases in period t:
Θ (xs, Gt) =
1
Π (xs)
· B¯s (Gt)− 11+ i (xs) · B¯s+1 (Gt) + Gs (Gt) . (2.21)
An analogous object in period t is given by:
Θ (xt, Gt) =
1
Π (xt)
· B¯− 1
1+ i (xt)
· B¯t+1 (Gt) + Gt. (2.22)
which implies that Λ satisfies government budget constraints for s ≥ t.
All this means that, given fiscal rule Λ, household’s maximization problem in
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period t can be described by the following Bellman equation:
VΛt (bt, zt|Gt) = max
ct, bt+1
{
u (ct, xt) + βEzt+1|ztV
Λ
t+1 (bt+1, zt+1|Gt)
}
(2.23)
subject to:
ct + τ (zt) ·Θ (xt, Gt) + bt+11+ i (xt) =
bt
Π (xt)
+ zt · f (xt)
bt+1 ≥ −ξ
where:
u(ct, xt) ≡ u˜
(
ct,
ct
q (xt)
)
.
and where VΛt+1 (bt+1, zt+1|Gt) is value function at the beginning of period t + 1
that is associated with a perfect foresight equilibrium that follows after fiscal
shock of size Gt and where government follows fiscal rule Λ specified in equa-
tion 2.18.5 It is important to highlight the fact that, according to 2.23, solution
to consumer problem (i.e., policy functions ) will depend on Λ. This occurs be-
cause, in the model with uninsured idiosyncratic risk, the Ricardian equivalence
ceases to hold and hence the way in which government finances fiscal deficits,
resulting from higher purchases in period t, becomes relevant for consumer’s
consumption-saving behavior.
Formula 2.23 shows that, given Λ, all changes in aggregate objects in period t
(i.e.: it,Θt,Πt, ft, qt and VΛt+1) that: i) are taken as given by households when solv-
ing the maximization problem in period t and ii) are affected by the fiscal shock
can be expressed as functions of two variables: xt and Gt.6 This implies that
the only aggregate determinants of a change in a time-dependent consumption
policy in period t, that is driven by the fiscal shock, are xt and Gt, which is re-
flected by the following notation:
{
cΛt (b, z|xt, Gt)
}
{b,z}∈B×Z. This, in turn, means
5Note that given the assumption about rational expectations consumers are able to calculate
the sequence of future value functions {Vs}s>t and recognize their dependence on Gt and Λ. This
implies that they know the form of VΛt+1 in period t + 1 and take it as given when solving the
maximization problem in period t.
6Observe that the remaining aggregate variable that is taken as given by households and which
affects the maximization problem in period t - the distribution of households µt - is a state variable
that is fixed and equal to its stationary equilibrium value µ and therefore is not affected by a rise
in G.
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that the impact of the stimulus on aggregate consumption in period t, which is
defined as:
CΛt (xt, Gt) ≡
∫
B×Z
cΛt (b, z|xt, Gt) dµt (b, z) (2.24)
can be summarized solely with xt and Gt and therefore the economy-wide re-
source constraint in period t can be rewritten as:
CΛ (xt, Gt) + Gt = Y (xt) . (2.25)
In what follows, I impose the following condition on utility function u:
ucx = 0 (2.26)
which means that marginal utility from consumption is not affected by the value
of product market tightness. The motivation for condition 2.26 and its role in the
analysis are discussed in Section 2.8 in greater detail.
Finally, the first order condition associated with problem 2.23 is:
uc (ct, xt) ≥ (1+ i (xt)) · β (2.27)
×Ezt+1|zt VΛt+1,b
(
(1+ i (xt)) ·
(
bt
Π (xt)
+ zt · f (xt)− ct − τ (bt, zt) ·Θ (xt, Gt)
)
, zt+1|Gt
)
which is satisfied with equality when bt+1 > −ξ.
Before proceeding, let us discuss the assumptions that have been made in the
analysis so far.
2.8 Discussion about the assumptions
The most significant departure from the canonical Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari frame-
work in my analysis is the specification of product market that features search
frictions. There are several important reasons for which this modification is in-
troduced.
First, there is a long tradition of modeling the productive role of aggregate
demand, which is crucial when analyzing the effects of fiscal stimulus, by incor-
porating search and matching frictions in the product market, which goes back
to a seminal contribution by Diamond (1982). By productive role I mean that
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changes in aggregate demand lead to shifts in capacity utilization and are not
entirely absorbed by changes in prices.
Second, it seems that this assumption is not very controversial as trade in
product market hardly exhibits Walrasian features: it is rather organized in a
decentralized way where frictions play an important role (see Michaillat and Saez
(2015)).
Third, I assume this specification of product market because search and match-
ing protocol allows to incorporate various price-setting mechanisms, with per-
fectly rigid prices and flexible prices as two polar cases, in a tractable manner.
Since, as we shall see, in the analyzed framework movements in prices resulting
from fiscal expansion will have redistributive effects affecting aggregate demand,
it is useful to have a simple way to modify the strength of that channel.
Most importantly, the formulation of product market that is used here allows
to represent all general equilibrium effects affecting both the supply side of the
product market and the demand side with only one variable - product market
tightness x. This property enables to compute the analytic formula for the fiscal
multiplier.
One technical remark is in order here. In contrast to Michaillat and Saez (2015)
and Michaillat and Saez (2018), who model search costs in terms of goods spent
by households while making consumer visits, I assume that these costs are cap-
tured by the disutility from search effort (see, e.g., Storesletten et al. (2017)). I
follow this convention because it preserves a standard form of the aggregate re-
source constraint known from the literature (i.e., without goods spent on search
activities on the demand side as in Michaillat and Saez (2015) and Michaillat and
Saez (2018)) and thus enables to compare my results with a broader set of theo-
retical outcomes derived in other works.
Finally, let us discuss the role of condition 2.26. Arguably, it is quite intuitive
and plausible: it implies that although market conditions (captured with x) influ-
ence the amount of effort needed to buy certain amount of goods (see equation
2.1), they do not affect his or her marginal consumption. This can be rational-
ized by the fact that shopping activities and consumption of products often occur
sequentially: during the first stage household collects a basket of consumption
goods which requires search effort that is related to the amount of purchases.
Subsequently, during the second stage, it consumes goods and neither effort ex-
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erted nor market conditions during the first stage influence the utility derived
from additional unit. In Section 3 I present functional form of u that satisfies
condition 2.26 and, additionally, it excludes wealth effects of search effort, as pos-
tulated by Storesletten et al. (2017). In the Appendix I relax condition 2.26 and I
derive the multiplier’s formula in the situation in which ucx 6= 0.7
3 Government multiplier: analytical exploration
In this section I study the main problem addressed in this paper, i.e. how house-
hold heterogeneity affects the value of government spending multiplier. Recall
that I consider an unexpected shock to government expenditures in period t and
until its arrival, economy is in stationary equilibrium. The shock is followed by
path {Gs}s>t which is pinned down by Gt and agents have perfect foresight about
aggregate variables in periods s > t.
3.1 Preliminary step
Let us start with a preliminary step in which I derive a general formula for the
multiplier in the analyzed economy:
Lemma 1. Suppose that economy is in stationary equilibrium at the beginning of period t
and government follows fiscal rule Λ. Then the value of government spending multiplier
in period t is:
dYt
dGt
=
1+ ∂C
Λ
t
∂Gt
1− ∂CΛt∂xt · 1f ′(xt)
. (3.1)
All proofs are postponed to the Appendix. Although very general, formula 3.1
provides us with some important insights about the determinants of multiplier’s
magnitude. First, notice that its value is affected by both the reaction of private
7Relaxing 2.26 gives rise to a mechanism through which private consumption is either
crowded in (when ucx > 0) or crowded out (when ucx < 0) by government purchases. Nev-
ertheless, this “mechanical” crowding out effect is absent in the vast majority of the literature
related to fiscal purchases and hence staying in line with it (and guaranteeing comparability of
my analysis with other works) is another argument for excluding the case in which ucx 6= 0.
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aggregate demand (represented by partial derivatives of C) and the change in ca-
pacity utilization f ′ (x) that drives the response of aggregate output. Second, its
magnitude depends on both direct effects of government expenditures on private
consumption (i.e., ∂C
Λ
∂G ) and indirect effects associated with general equilibrium
forces summarized with a reaction of private demand to change in product mar-
ket tightness x (i.e., ∂C
Λ
∂x ). Finally, it is important to note that multiplier’s value
depends implicitly on the underlying fiscal ruleΛ that specifies the way in which
additional government purchases are financed.
3.2 Analytical formula for the government spending multiplier
3.2.1 Government spending multiplier in economy with heterogeneous house-
holds
Before presenting the main result of the paper, I will introduce some additional
notation which enables to write down the formula for the multiplier in a hetero-
geneous agent economy in a concise way.
First, to economize on notation, for now we will suppress the dependence
of variables on time and we will use the following aggregation operator Eµ to
denote the expected value of variable m in the population:
Eµm ≡
∫
B×Z
m (b, z) dµ (b, z) .
where m (b, z) is a variable associated with household that has b of liquid assets
and operates with capacity z. Second, we define individual marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) and marginal propensity to save (MPS) of a household as:
MPC ≡ dc
dy
, MPS ≡ 1
1+ i
· db
′
dy
, where y ≡ z · f (x)− τ (z) ·Θ. (3.2)
i.e., y is household’s disposable income. Similarly to Auclert (2017), let us define
the unhedged interest rate exposure as:
URE ≡ b
Π
+ z · f − τ ·Θ− c (3.3)
which can be thought of as a difference between maturing assets and maturing
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liabilities. Moreover, without loss of generality, I standardize:
Π = 1
in stationary equilibrium. I assume that utility u˜ takes the following form:
u˜ (c, v) =

1
1−σ ·
(
c− κφ · vφ
)1−σ
f or σ ∈ (0,+∞)r {1}
log
(
c− κφ · vφ
)
. f or σ = 1
taken from Storesletten et al. (2017) where κ > 0 and φ ≥ 1. The specification of u˜
as Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman preferences rules out wealth effects in search
effort. Re-expressing in terms of utility function u yields:
u (c, x) =
1
1− σ ·
[(
c− κ
φ
·
(
c
q (x)
)
φ
)1−σ
− 1
]
. (3.4)
To guarantee that condition concerning the mixed derivative ucx holds (see equa-
tion 2.26), I set σ = 1 and φ = 1 which implies the log utility function where
search effort that is linear in terms of the amount of consumed goods.8
Finally, let us define the following variable α:
α ≡
dΠ
dx
dY
dx
(3.5)
Since a rise in x can be interpreted as an increase in aggregate demand in the
model (recall that output capacity is fixed and normalized to unity), α can be
thought of as a value that characterizes the comovement of prices and output
resulting from a positive demand shock.
The following theorem presents the main result of the paper:
Theorem 2. Suppose that economy is in stationary equilibrium at the beginning of pe-
riod t, condition 2.26 holds, government follows fiscal rule Λ and agents feature perfect
8It is easy to see that if σ = φ = 1 then the value of κ becomes irrelevant for equilibrium
allocation. In the Appendix I relax condition 2.26 and I derive the multiplier’s formula in a more
general case (where, to avoid the indeterminacy of u, I consider the equilibrium in which q(x) >
κ).
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foresight about aggregate variables for s > t. Under those assumptions the formula for
the government spending multiplier is:
dYt
dGt
=
1+ ∂C
Λ
t
∂Gt
1− ∂CΛt∂xt · 1f ′(xt)
(3.6)
where:
∂CΛt
∂Gt
≡ −
(
1− λ
1+ i
)
·Eµ (MPC · τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Taxation channel
+ β · (1+ i) ·Eµ
(
MPS · 1
ucc (c)
·VΛbG
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expectations channel
and:
∂CΛt
∂xt
· 1
f ′ (xt)
≡ − Ω
1+ i
·Eµ (MPS · c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intertemporal substitution channel
+
Ω
1+ i
·Eµ (MPC ·URE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest rate exposure channel
+Eµ (MPC · z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income channel
−
(
Ω
(1+ i)2
− α
)
· B¯ ·Eµ (MPC · τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt service costs channel
−α ·Eµ (MPC · b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fisher channel
where Ω andVΛbG are defined as:
Ω ≡ φΠ · α+ φY.
VΛbG ≡ Ezt+1|ztVΛt+1,bG ((1+ i) ·UREt, zt+1|Gt) |UREt=URE, Gt=G, VΛt+1=V
where variables without time subscripts are evaluated at their stationary equilibrium lev-
els.
There are two additional variables in Theorem 2 that have not been described
yet: Ω measures the responsiveness of monetary policy to changes in output and
prices caused by a shift in market tightness resulting from the fiscal expansion.
Variable VΛbG measures how expectations about future economic prospects vary
with changes in government purchases at the individual level.
Before interpreting the formula in greater detail, let me point to some distinc-
tive features of this result. First, expression 2 bears some resemblance to the result
from the seminal work by Auclert (2017) as it contains averaged cross-products of
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MPC (or MPS) and individual consumer characteristics. In contrast to his work,
however, my result is not a partial equilibrium outcome and it captures general
equilibrium effects as well. Second, some works (e.g., Kaplan et al. (2016) and
Hagedorn et al. (2017), Kopiec (2018)) use numerical methods to decompose im-
pulse response functions to aggregate shocks in heterogeneous agent economies
into model-based channels but they do not explain what are the exact forces be-
hind those mechanisms. Theorem 2 overcomes this unclarity by presenting the
determinants of the magnitudes of those channels.
Let us discuss the forces that affect the value of the multiplier in economy
with heterogeneous households. The first channel that appears in the numera-
tor is related to the increase in taxation needed to finance additional government
spending. Obviously, this channel has negative impact on the value of dY/dG as
both MPC and τ are positive for all agents. To minimize this effect, government
should either increase the proportion of additional government purchases that is
financed with debt (i.e. raise λ) or it should levy larger shares in total tax burden τ
on households with lower marginal propensities to consume. The latter coupled
with empirical observations that richer consumers tend to exhibit smaller MPCs
(see Figure 4.1) implies that to dampen the negative impact of higher taxes on the
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus government should apply more progressive taxes.
Second channel in the numerator is the so-called expectations channel. Its name
is motivated by the presence of aggregated expectations over mixed derivatives
VΛbG of future value functions. Notice if, for instance, V
Λ
t+1,bG < 0 then value
function “tomorrow” flattens as a result of higher fiscal expenditures “today”.
This, together with the Euler equation associated with period when expansion
starts, can be interpreted as a decline in precautionary motives coming from the
current rise in G. If it is the case for a sufficiently large measure of agents then
rising consumer confidence crowds private consumption in (recall that ucc < 0)
and amplifies the effects of higher government purchases. Again, it is important
to highlight that the dependence of the multiplier on fiscal rule Λ pursued by
government is a consequence of the interplay between market incompleteness
and liquidity constraint faced by households which, combined, imply that Ricar-
dian equivalence does not hold and therefore the way in which dGt is financed
becomes relevant for the response of private sector. In Section 4 I demonstrate
the relationship between Λ andVΛbG by comparing two scenarios associated with
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two different fiscal rules: tax-financed and debt-financed stimulus.
Let us turn to forces that appear in the denominator. First of them is related to
intertemporal substitution spurred by monetary policy response during fiscal ex-
pansion: if Ω is large then central bank counteracts government stimulus aggres-
sively by raising nominal interest rates and thus creates incentives to save and to
reduce private spending which tends to lower the multiplier’s value. Monetary
authority reaction is prescribed by Taylor rule and takes place because both price
level and output rise during expansion. Second force is associated with the un-
hedged interest rate exposure of households. Notice that it is an outcome of two
mechanisms that go in opposite directions for households from different parts
of wealth distribution. On the one hand, MPC · URE is negative for indebted
agents that roll over their liabilities. On the other hand, this product is positive
for agents with high URE. If the former group prevails over the latter then a more
responsive monetary policy diminishes the effects of government purchases. In
the opposite case, a more aggressive central bank’s reaction amplifies the im-
pact of government purchases through wealth effects. Third channel is related to
changes in income that accompany fiscal stimulus and it strengthens the effects
of expansion. This channel is tightly related to a standard, Keynesian feedback
loop between household income and consumption. Fourth force has to do with
changes in taxes needed to balance the budget as debt service cost vary.9 These
shifts have two sources: if monetary policy reacts to fiscal stimulus by raising
nominal rates significantly then government is forced to issue new debt at lower
price and thus has to levy additional taxes to balance the budget. On the other
hand, if the stimulation of aggregate demand leads to a substantial rise in prices
(captured by parameter α) then the nominal public debt burden, which has to be
repaid in the current period, decreases and gives rise to a downward adjustment
in taxes. This can be seen as a kind of Fisher channel that is associated with public
liabilities. Household balance sheets are affected by the same force: if a consumer
has positive nominal wealth then increasing prices impoverish him or her, lead to
cut in expenditures which tends to dampen the effects of fiscal stimulus. Contrar-
9Observe that this channel is present even if it assumed that stimulus is financed solely with
debt. This is because, except for funds needed to finance additional fiscal purchases, government
has to balance its budget after changes in i and Π that are induced by its intervention (that can be
summarized with the behavior of x). As I assume that the only argument associated with Λ is Gt
then, by construction, Bt+1 does not react to general equilibrium effects captured with x.
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ily, for agents with nominal debt, higher prices lower the real value of liabilities
and crowd private expenditures in.
3.2.2 Special case: government spending multiplier in economy with identi-
cal households
To highlight the role of household heterogeneity in the propagation of fiscal stim-
ulus it is useful to study the extreme case in which inequality across agents is
eliminated. For tractability (and to guarantee comparability with the benchmark
scenario which is discussed in Section 4.2), for now I will consider a one-time
fiscal shock and assume that λ = 0 which means that stimulus is financed with
taxes. Observe that under this assumption, in the representative agent economy
we have:
b′ = b = B¯′ = B¯. (3.7)
Additionally, since agents are identical:
τ (z) = 1, z = 1.
Notice that in this situation, the Fisher channel associated with household bal-
ance sheet (see formula 3.6) is exactly offset by the impact of inflation on public
debt:
α · B¯ ·Eµ (MPC · τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt service costs channel: repayment
− α ·Eµ (MPC · b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fisher channel
= α · B¯ ·MPC− α ·MPC · b = 0
where the last equality follows from condition 3.7. This occurs because on the
one hand higher inflation decreases household wealth (which imposes a down-
ward pressure on private consumption) but, one the other hand, it decreases the
value of public debt that has to be repaid which leads to reduction in taxes (which
stimulates consumption). The fact that both forces cancel out is not surprising be-
cause in the representative agent model government liabilities have to be settled
by households (so in fact they are household liabilities) and, at the same time gov-
ernment bonds are household assets. This means that any change in the value of
liquid assets has no impact on consumer wealth.
23
Analogously, the impact of a rise in i, that accompanies the fiscal shock, on
consumer balance sheet (captured by URE) during fiscal expansion is offset by
a symmetric mechanism that affects government that issues new debt B¯′. More
specifically, an increase in i makes the purchase of assets b′ by households cheaper
which raises the relative value of their cash-in-hand. At the same time, however,
government has to issue new debt at lower price which, automatically, gives rise
to budget deficit that under the balanced-budget rule (i.e., when λ = 0) is covered
with a rise in taxes which, in turn, lowers consumer’s disposable income. Again,
both effects cancel out in the representative agent framework:10
Ω
1+ i
·Eµ (MPC ·URE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest rate exposure channel
− Ω
(1+ i)2
· B¯ ·Eµ (MPC · τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt service costs channel: issuance
=
Ω
(1+ i)2
·MPC · b′ − Ω
(1+ i)2
· B¯ ·MPC = 0.
Notice that since the stimulus is assumed to be tax-financed and it is a one-time
shock then the representative agent economy is back in stationary equilibrium in
period s = t+ 1 and therefore VΛt+1 remains unaffected by the intervention which
implies:11
VΛt+1 = V =⇒ β · (1+ i) ·Eµ
(
MPS · 1
ucc (c)
·VΛbG
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expectations channel
= 0.
The following corollary summarizes those findings and presents the formula for
the tax-financed multiplier in economy where agents are identical:12
10Note that from definition of URE and from household’s budget constraint (equation 2.4):
URE =
b′
1+ i
.
11This is because the only aggregate state variable in this special case is B¯ which is constant
over time. Hence, by backward induction:
V = lim
t→+∞V
Λ
t = ... = V
Λ
t+2 = V
Λ
t+1.
12Observe that since debt service cost channel cancels out with Fisher and URE channel and
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Corollary 3. Let us consider a one-time, budget-neutral increase in government pur-
chases in a representative agent economy in period t. The associated government spend-
ing multiplier is given by:
dYt
dGt
=
1
1+ Ω1+i · c
. (3.8)
To put it differently, the only channel through which fiscal stimulus interacts
with private demand in the representative agent case when λ = 0 and fiscal shock
lasts for one period is the intertemporal substitution mechanism. This outcome
bears some analogies to the result presented by Kaplan et al. (2016) for the case
of monetary policy in the standard representative agent New Keynesian model.
4 Household heterogeneity and the multiplier’s value:
empirical assessment
Note, that in contrast to Auclert (2017), we cannot use the so-called sufficient
statistic approach to estimate the multiplier’s value from expression 3.6. This is
because one of the channels - namely the expectations channel - contains unob-
served elements that depend on the model’s structure. Therefore, the estimation
strategy followed in this paper is to calibrate the model to match empirical objects
that are relevant from the point of view of the conducted analysis and, on the ba-
sis of that model, compute the multiplier. In particular, as formula 3.6 suggests,
to obtain a good estimate of the multiplier it will be important to mimic closely
the empirical features of MPC.
Before moving to the quantitative exercise in which the multiplier’s size is
calculated, it is instructive to analyze Figures 4.1 and 4.2 showing the relation-
ships between individual-level variables τ, URE, z, b, c and MPC (or MPS) docu-
mented in the SHIW survey conducted among Italian households in 2016. In gen-
because τ = z = 1 then formula 3.6 becomes:
dYt
dGt
=
1−MPC
1−MPC + Ω1+i ·MPS · c
which, because MPS = 1−MPC is equivalent to equation 3.8.
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Figure 4.1: Empirical relationships between MPC and τ, URE, z, b in SHIW 2016
0 1 2 3 4 5
τ
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
M
P
C
-5 0 5 10
URE
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
M
P
C
0 1 2 3 4
z
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
M
P
C
-5 0 5 10
b
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
M
P
C
To prepare the plots above I have sorted pairs describing household-level variables that consist of τ (or, alternatively URE,
z, b) and MPC in the ascending order with respect to the first coordinate. Second I have grouped those pairs into 50 bins.
For each bin I have computed mean values of τ (or, alternatively URE, z, b) and MPC which are represented as dots in
the figure. Standardization of τ, URE, z and b is described in the core text.
eral, it can be observed that households with lower income (or lower consump-
tion, lower unhedged interest rate exposure) tend to exhibit higher MPC. Simi-
larly, those, whose share in aggregate tax burden is smaller, have larger MPC. At
the same time, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 give us some intuitions about averaged cross-
products that constitute channels affecting multiplier’s magnitude described in
Theorem 2.
4.1 Calibration of the model
The period in the model is equal to one year and the calibration target are mo-
ments characterizing Italian economy. I choose Italy because of the availability
of MPC data measured at the household level in the SHIW survey. As the av-
erage level of MPC documented therein equals 0.475 can be hardly achieved in
the standard incomplete market model then, in what follows, I will consider two
alternative modifications suggested by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) to solve this
problem. To match the mean level of empirical MPC, first of them assumes that
a proportion µHTM of households are rule-of-thumb (hand-to-mouth) consumers
that feature MPC = 1. In the second specification there are two groups of con-
sumers of equal measure: patient households characterized with βH and impa-
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Figure 4.2: Empirical relationship between MPS and c in SHIW 2016
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To prepare the plot above I have sorted pairs describing household-level consumption c and MPS in the ascending order
with respect to the first coordinate. Second I have grouped those pairs into 50 bins. For each bin I have computed mean
values of c and MPS which are represented as dots in the figure. Standardization of c is described in the core text.
tient households with discount factor equal to βL, where βH > βL.13 Intuitively,
raising the value of µHTM (or, alternatively, lowering βL) enables to increase the
average level of MPC generated by the model. Despite those modifications, for-
mula 3.6 remains valid.14
4.1.1 Model with hand-to-mouth agents
Let us turn to calibration of the first version of the model in which proportion
µHTM exhibits MPC = 1. As it has been already mentioned, the assumed func-
tional form for u is:
u (c, x) =
1
1− σ ·
[(
c− κ
φ
·
(
c
q (x)
)
φ
)1−σ
− 1
]
13More precisely, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) experimented with a uniform decrease in β
across all agents to match empirical value of average MPC. This leads to a drastic and unreal-
istic increase in real interest rates in stationary equilibrium. To avoid this problem, I following
Auclert (2017) and split the population into two subgroups: patient and impatient households.
The value of βL is calibrated to match the average value of MPC and the calibration target for βH
is the real interest rate.
14The only change that is needed to guarantee that 3.6 holds in economy with patient and
impatient households is to take β ∈ {βL, βH} under the integral associated with expectations
channel.
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Table 1: Parameters set without model simulations, identical for models with hand-to-
mouth households and heterogeneous discount factors.
Parameter Name Value Target/Source
f Probability of selling output 0.763 Capacity utilization
Π Price index 1 Standardization
φY Parameter of Taylor rule 0.125 Galí (2008)
φΠ Parameter of Taylor rule 1.5 Galí (2008)
i¯ Parameter of Taylor rule 0.02 Fisher equation
α Demand-driven comovement of Y and Π 0.51 SVAR evidence
B¯ Real public debt 0.99 Debt to GDP ratio
σ Risk aversion 1 Condition 2.26
φ Search effort curvature 1 Condition 2.26
{τ (z)}z∈Z Shares in total tax burden not reported Italian tax system
G Government purchases 0.28 Equation 2.4
λ Stimulus financing rule {0, 1.02} Tax/debt financed dG
and to eliminate wealth effects of search effort (see Storesletten et al. (2017)) and
to guarantee that condition 2.26 holds parameters σ and φ are equal to one. This,
in turn, implies that parameter κ is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation so we
do not need to calibrate its value - it occurs because κ and q (x) do not appear in
equations that determine equilibrium when σ = φ = 1 .15
I use the annual real interest rate equal to 2% to pin down the value of β. Since
I consider a stationary equilibrium in whichΠ = 1 the value of parameter i¯ in the
Taylor rule equals the real interest rate. Therefore, as it is the case in the literature,
while computing stationary allocation I iterate over i¯ and keep Π constant. The
fact that both Π and f are assumed to be one-argument, monotone functions of x
implies that there is a bijective relationship between them. This coupled with the
fact that Π is assumed to be constant implies that f can be treated as parameter
of the model. Its value is set to be equal to the capacity utilization in Italy in
2016 documented by EUROSTAT. I assume that the two remaining parameters
associated with monetary policy rule take standard, textbook values: φΠ = 1.5
and φY = 0.125 (Galí (2008)).
Aggregate public debt in stationary equilibrium B¯ is set to be equal to 1.31 · f
15To see that notice that when σ = 1 and φ = 1 then uc(c, x) is equal to 1c . This means that
κ does not affect policy functions c(b, z) and b′(b, z) (see the Euler equation) and thus its value
becomes irrelevant for the allocation in equilibrium.
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which is the value corresponding to the level of government debt of 131% GDP
in 2016. The comovement between price index and output when economy is af-
fected by demand shock which is captured by parameter α is set to be equal 0.51.
This value is based on the SVAR model in which demand shocks are identified
with sign restrictions, which is presented in the Appendix in a more detailed way.
The calibration target for ξ (parameter that governs the tightness of liquid-
ity constraint) is set to match the ratio between aggregate consumer debt and
aggregate positive liquid assets of households calculated from the SHIW survey
and equal to 0.44. One comment is in order here: several works analyzing het-
erogeneous agent economies (e.g., McKay and Reis (2016b), Krueger et al. (2016)
and Kopiec (2018)) standardize the parameter that characterizes the liquidity con-
straint to zero. Formula 3.6 shows why this normalization may lead to a distorted
picture of the model’s reaction to aggregate shocks: if b (and b′) is imposed to
be non-negative for all agents then it automatically imposes a restriction on the
signs of both the interest rate exposure (notice that from the budget constraint
b′ = URE) and the Fisher channel. In particular, in the context of government
expenditures shock analyzed here, this assumption implies that Fisher channel
always dampens and interest rate exposure channel always amplifies its impact.
As already mentioned, parameter µHTM is calibrated to match the average
level of MPC in the SHIW survey. I assume that rule-of-thumb consumers consti-
tute an equal proportion of agents across all states.16
To pin down vector {τ (z)}z∈Z I first normalize the progressive income tax
scale in Italy with respect to average disposable income observed in the data
which gives the income tax thresholds in the model. I can now assign the tax
rate τ˜ to each household which is indexed productivity z. Simultaneously, given
those thresholds and aggregate output f , I compute the total budget revenues
from income tax Θ. To compute the share τ of each household in aggregate tax
burden Θ, I divide τ˜ · f · z (individual amount of tax paid to government) by Θ.
GivenΘ, B¯,Π and i¯, I calculate the value of government purchases G in stationary
16In other words, conditional distributions of hand-to-mouth and optimizing agents are the
same. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) assume that that the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers is
75 percent in deciles 1–3 of cash-in-hand distribution, 40 percent in deciles 4–7, and 30 percent in
deciles 8–10. This gives two additional parameters that are used to achieve calibration targets. In
my work I set an equal proportion of hand-to-mouth agents and thus I have two parameters less
to match the data. Despite that, I manage to mimic empirical observations reasonably well.
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Table 2: Parameters calibrated with the simulated model with a proportion of hand-to-
mouth agents
Parameter Name Value Target/Source
β Discount factor 0.9703 Real interest rate
ξ Liquidity constraint −2.2 Ratio of debt to assets
µHTM Proportion of HTM agents 0.42 Average MPC
σ2T Variance of transitory shocks 0.05 MPC distribution
σ2P Variance of persistent shocks 0.04 MPC distribution
ρP Autocorrelation of persistent component 0.958 MPC distribution
equilibrium from government budget constraint 2.4.17 Parameter λ determines
the way in which government finances the stimulus in period t and is set to be
equal to 0 in the benchmark simulation (i.e. additional government purchases are
financed solely by taxes) and it equals 1 + i¯ when the alternative scenario (debt-
financed stimulus) is considered. More specifically, the benchmark fiscal rule Λ0
is given by:
Λ0 : Gt → [{Gt, G, G, ...} , {B¯, B¯, ...}] .
Let us turn to the calibration of the income process that governs changes in z at
the individual level. Similarly to Krueger et al. (2016), I assume that productivity
follows a process with transitory and persistent components:log z′ = s + eTs′ = ρP · s + eP
where by ρP I denote the autocorrelation of persistent component, eT is a tran-
sitory innovation and eP is the shock that influences the evolution of persistent
component s. Parameters ρP, σ2P (variance of the shock to persistent component),
σ2T (variance of the shock to transitory component) are calibrated using the Simu-
lated Method of Moments to match the average values of MPC (associated with
a transitory change in disposable income) across cash-in-hand deciles.18 Formula
17Recall that we have: ∫
B×Z
T (z) dµ (b, z) = Θ.
18Given φP, σ2P and σ
2
T I use the Rouwenhorst algorithm to discretize the persistent component
of the process and I apply the Gauss-Hermite quadrature to approximate the transitory shock.
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Figure 4.3: SMM estimation of φP, σ2P, σ
2
T and µHTM: average MPC across cash-
in-hand deciles in the model and in the data.
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3.6 clearly shows why this calibration target is crucial when evaluating the value
of fiscal multiplier: MPC and MPS = 1− MPC enter all the channels affecting
the size of dY/dG so it is important to mimic their empirical counterparts closely
to obtain a plausible estimate of the multiplier. Estimation results for ρP, σ2P, σ
2
T
are displayed in Figure 4.3.19
Calibrated parameters can be divided into two subgroups. First of them con-
tains those calibrated with reference to the literature and to moments which do
not require model simulations and is summarized in Table 1. Second group are
values pinned down by model simulations (Table 2).
4.1.2 Model with patient and impatient households
In this subsection I follow Auclert (2017) and I describe the calibration of the
model where agents are grouped into two populations of measure 0.5: patient
and impatient households. The majority of parameter values are set at levels that
Cash-in-hand is defined as: b/Π+ f · z.
19Observe that MPC is not monotonically decreasing with respect to cash-in-hand deciles. This
may look a bit surprising but is is driven by the fact that under the assumed specification of id-
iosyncratic income risk it may occur that agent that exhibits low value of persistent shock and
high value of transitory innovation has larger cash-in-hand than agent with high value of persis-
tent shock and low value of transitory innovation. The former tends to have higher MPC than the
latter which may give rise to locally increasing relationship between cash-in-hand and MPC.
31
Table 3: Parameters calibrated with the simulated model with heterogeneous discount
factors
Parameter Name Value Target/Source
βH Discount factor of patient agents 0.9736 Real interest rate
βL Discount factor of impatient agents 0.69 Average MPC
ξ Liquidity constraint −1.35 Ratio of debt to assets
σ2T Variance of transitory shocks 0.05 MPC distribution
σ2P Variance of persistent shocks 0.04 MPC distribution
ρP Autocorrelation of persistent component 0.958 MPC distribution
are identical with those in the model with hand-to-mouth consumers (see table
1). There are several exceptions: parameters calibrated with the simulated model.
First, there are two discount factors: βL (associated with impatient house-
holds) and βH (associated with patient households) that satisfy βL < βH. The
value of discount factor βH is set to match the level of real interest rate. As men-
tioned, the calibration target for βL is the average level of MPC documented in
the SHIW survey. Introducing discount factor heterogeneity changes the station-
ary distribution of households significantly (in comparison to the model with
hand-to-mouth consumers) and thus to match the ratio between aggregate debt
and aggregate positive assets we need to reparametrize the tightness of liquidity
constraint captured with ξ.
The remaining parameters: ρP, σ2P, σ
2
T were used to match the distribution of
MPC across cash-in-hand deciles in the model with rule-of-thumb consumers.
The problem with the variant of the model with heterogeneous discount factor
is that it generates excessively large differences in MPC across agents (in com-
parison to empirical evidence) irrespectively of values assigned to parameters
ρP, σ2P, σ
2
T. Figure 4.3 provides an example of the distribution of MPC generated
by the model with βL and βH in which ρP, σ2P, σ
2
T take values identical to those
calibrated for the model with hand-to-mouth agents. As discussed later, the fact
that the model with heterogeneous discount factors fails to mimic this pattern has
some important consequences for the evaluation of fiscal policy effectiveness.
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4.2 Government spending multiplier: benchmark scenario
We are in position to use the formula presented in Theorem 2 and to quantify
the impact of channels affecting multiplier’s value. This exercise is important be-
cause, as discussed previously, several channels are outcomes of forces that have
opposite directions and therefore their signs are ambiguous. In what follows, I
inspect the effects of fiscal policy shock in both the model with hand-to-mouth
agents and the model with patient and impatient households.
As already mentioned, in the benchmark case I assume that: Gt > G and
Gs = G for s > t (i.e., fiscal shock lasts for one period) and that λ is equal to
zero (i.e., the stimulus is budget neutral).20 The last assumption is made because
if a country is plagued by large debt-to-GDP ratio then issuing additional gov-
ernment bonds can be costly or even impossible. Under such circumstances the
only way to increase government consumption is to raise taxes. As the model is
calibrated to match the moments of Italian economy - a country that has been un-
der severe fiscal pressure during the Eurozone Crisis and whose ability to issue
new debt was limited - then the tax-financed government expansion seems to be
a realistic scenario.
In the simulation, government purchases increase by 0.1% of GDP in period
t and the shock is followed by a perfect-foresight transition path along which
economy converges back to stationary equilibrium.21
The value of the multiplier is approximated by the following expression:
dYt
dGt
≈ Yt −Y
Gt − G .
where Yt is the first element of output transition path.
To estimate the magnitude of multiplier’s channels, I will use the following
20Observe that I assume that although Italy is a member of the Eurozone, central bank reacts to
fiscal shock. This assumption remains plausible if Italy is considered as a large economy among
other members of the currency union or if stimulus is coordinated across the Eurozone. The
opposite case implies that the ECB does not react to Italian shocks is isomorphic to the situation
in which φΠ = φY = 0 and it is analyzed in Section 4.3.1.
21I use a relatively small size of the shock to obtain a better approximation of the multiplier.
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approximation of the MPC of household with assets b and productivity z:
MPC (b, z) ≈ c (b, z + eT)− c (b, z)
[ f · (z + eT)− f · z]− [τ (z + eT)− τ (z)] ·Θ
where the numerator is the difference between consumption levels of household
with productivity z + eT and of households with productivity z in stationary
equilibrium. The denominator is the corresponding difference in disposable in-
come. Recall that by eT I denote the value of a transitory productivity shock.
Given MPC (b, z) and values of c, τ, URE, z, b I compute the magnitudes of: tax-
ation channel, intertemporal substitution channel, interest rate exposure channel,
income channel, debt service costs channel and Fisher channel. The size of expec-
tations channel is derived from equation 3.6 given dYtdGt and values of the remain-
ing channels.22
Results are reported in Table 4. The budget-neutral government spending
multiplier equals 0.69 in the model with a fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers
and it is equal to 0.43 in economy with patient and impatient households. For
each variant of the model I report two columns of results. First column contains
the values of terms appearing in formula 3.6 that describe the magnitudes of
channels through which fiscal stimulus affects aggregate demand and, as a con-
sequence, output. To interpret those numbers, second column reports the size of
the multiplier under a hypothetical scenario, when a given channel is shut off. If
it exceeds the value of dYtdGt then it means that the corresponding channel crowds
private consumption out and dampens the impact of government expenditures
on output. If, on the other hand, it is lower than dYtdGt then it implies that consump-
tion is crowded in by a given channel and the effects of stimulus are amplified.
Let us turn to the comparison of two versions of the model.23 The main disad-
vantage of the variant with hand-to-mouth agents is that a fraction of consumers
is assumed to be unable to optimize and, in particular, it cannot make intertempo-
ral choices. This may raise concerns about its ability to measure the expectations
channel accurately (as rule-of-thumb agents exhibit MPS = 0). Nevertheless, a
22I choose this “indirect” method to estimate the size of the expectations channel because of
relatively large approximation errors associated with the computation of mixed derivatives VbG
when evaluating this channel directly.
23Impulse response functions of main aggregate variables in the benchmark simulation for both
variants of the model are reported in the Appendix.
34
comparison with the model populated with patient and impatient households
indicates that the potential approximation error is relatively small in absolute
terms. On the other hand, the main weakness of the model with heterogeneous
discount factors is that it fails to mimic the distribution of MPC across cash-in-
hand deciles (see Figure 4.3). This may lead to some erroneous conclusions con-
cerning the aggregate demand reaction to changes in the real value of their liq-
uid positions and URE.24 Table 4 shows that, indeed, the inability to match the
distributional features of MPC by the model with patient and impatient house-
holds has some tremendous consequences for the assessment of channels through
which fiscal shock operates. In particular, not only do both the Fisher channel (as-
sociated with liquid positions) and the interest rate exposure channel (associated
with URE) have opposite signs in two versions of the model, but also the differ-
ence between those values is large in absolute terms. The fact that the model with
rule-of-thumb consumers fits the distribution of MPC incomparably better than
the model with heterogeneous discount factors clearly indicates that estimates of
interest rate exposure and Fisher channels are more realistic. This implies that
the model with a fraction of hand-to-mouth agents significantly overperforms
the model with patient and impatient households and hence, in what follows, I
will analyze the effects of fiscal stimulus using only this version.
Decomposition shows that only interest exposure channel and income chan-
nel amplify the effects of fiscal stimulus. Their impact on the propagation of
government expenditures shock is large: in the absence of each of them, the mul-
tiplier’s value drops by more than 50%. The largest channels that crowd out
aggregate consumption and thus dampen the effects of stimulus are: taxation
channel and Fisher channel. If closed, each of them generates a rise in the multi-
plier by approximately 100%. The fact that both Fisher and interest rate exposure
channel have a significant impact dYtdGt indicates that wealth heterogeneity is an
important determinant of fiscal policy effectiveness.
Observe, that the sign of Fisher channel is somewhat counterintuitive, as in
the literature there is a common belief that a rise in prices decreases the real value
of loans of indebted households (who, at the same time, exhibit large MPC) and
24Notice that, by construction, cash-in-hand is positively correlated with liquid asset holdings
and, as in the stationary equilibrium distributions of: URE and liquid assets are the same, it is
also positively correlated with the former.
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Table 4: Fiscal multiplier: quantitative decomposition, benchmark scenario in
two versions of the model
Model with HTM agents Model with βL and βH
Value Counterfactual dYtdGt Value Counterfactual
dYt
dGt
Taxation channel −0.63 1.95 −0.42 0.79
Expectations channel −0.03 0.76 −0.08 0.50
Intertemporal substitution channel −0.13 0.94 −0.24 0.54
Interest rate exposure channel 0.56 0.32 −0.50 0.76
Income channel 0.63 0.30 0.43 0.31
Debt service costs channel −0.22 1.22 −0.14 0.49
Fisher channel −0.34 2.17 0.29 0.35
MULTIPLIER: dYtdGt 0.69 0.43
thus stimulates private spending. As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, the difference be-
tween MPC of the richest and the poorest is not very large. This coupled with the
fact that the liquid net worth of Italian households is positive (recall that the ratio
between absolute values of debt and positive liquid balances is 0.44) implies that
the aggregate positive reaction of consumption of those who benefit from a rise in
prices during fiscal expansion is weaker than the aggregate negative reaction of
those those whose net worth depreciates in real terms. More precisely, quantita-
tive decomposition of the Fisher channel into responses of debtors and creditors
reads:
−α ·Eµ (MPC · b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−0.34
= −α ·Eµ (MPC · b|b < 0) ·
∫
b<0
dµ (b, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0.28
−α ·Eµ (MPC · b|b ≥ 0) ·
∫
b≥0
dµ (b, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−0.62
.
The analogous decomposition of interest rate exposure channel is:
Ω
1+ i
·Eµ (MPC ·URE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0.56
=
Ω
1+ i
·Eµ (MPC ·URE|b < 0) ·
∫
b<0
dµ (b, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−0.49
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+
Ω
1+ i
·Eµ (MPC ·URE|b ≥ 0) ·
∫
b≥0
dµ (b, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1.05
.
Monetary policy reaction to higher output and prices raises real interest rates
which discourage agents from consumption in period t but the quantitative im-
portance of this mechanism is limited (see the value that corresponds to intertem-
poral substitution channel in Table 4). As the amount of public debt in Italy is
relatively large then so is the size of the debt service costs channel. It influences
the multiplier because as nominal interest rates rise government issues new debt
at lower price. Since it is assumed that φΠ > 1 in the Taylor rule, this effect is
not outweighed by a rise in prices that lower the real value of debt that has to be
repaid in period t.
4.3 Government spending multiplier: alternative scenarios
In this part I study the magnitude of the multiplier in the model with rule-of-
thumb households under two three alternative scenarios: more active monetary
policy, debt-financed stimulus and more persistent fiscal shock.
4.3.1 More active monetary policy
The role of the monetary policy reaction in the propagation of fiscal stimulus
has been discussed, among others, by Woodford (2011), who argued that more
accommodative monetary policy rule tends to raise the multiplier’s size.25 The
intuition behind this result is straightforward: as fiscal policy shock causes a rise
of both prices and output then, under a standard parametrization of Taylor rule,
nominal interest rates increase. A more aggressive response of monetary policy
translates into a more dynamic rise of nominal rates and, when price rigidities
are in place, real rates and creates stronger incentives to reduce consumption. I
reinvestigate this mechanism in the model with heterogeneous households.
25As pointed by Woodford (2011), the situation in which monetary policy is constrained by zero
lower bound can be seen as an extreme case of accommodative monetary policy which implies
that there is not reaction of central bank to shifts in government purchases. This case, in turn,
has been widely discussed in the literature that emerged in the aftermath of the Great Recession
(see, e.g., Eggertsson (2011), Christiano et al. (2011)) and the main conclusion from those works is
that higher government purchases are more effective in spurring a recovery when economy is in
liquidity trap.
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Table 5: Alternative scenarios: more active monetary policy, debt-financed stim-
ulus and persistent fiscal shock
Channel\Scenario Benchmark More active
monetary
policy
Debt-financed
stimulus
Persistent shock
Taxation channel −0.63 −0.63 0 −0.63
Expectations channel −0.03 −0.06 −0.39 −0.15
Intertemporal substitution channel −0.13 −0.26 −0.13 −0.13
Interest rate exposure channel 0.56 1.12 0.56 0.56
Income channel 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
Debt service costs channel −0.22 −0.75 −0.22 −0.22
Fisher channel −0.34 −0.34 −0.34 −0.34
MULTIPLIER 0.69 0.52 1.24 0.45
To this end, I compare the benchmark scenario to the one in which both φΠ
and φY are two times larger (which implies that the value of Ω doubles, too) and
other parameters remain unchanged with respect to the benchmark (in particular,
government follows fiscal rule Λ0). Formula 3.6 implies that this automatically
increases the magnitude of two channels in the model: intertemporal substitution
channel and interest exposure channel by 100% (see Table 5). The former, by
creating incentives to save, tends to dampen the effects of fiscal stimulus while
the latter amplify it significantly (through wealth effects).
Second, when monetary policy becomes more active, it is more expensive for
government to roll over public debt as the price of newly issued bonds is cut
severely by central bank’s actions. This implies that government has to raise taxes
more aggressively to balance its budget which crowds out private spending.
Overall, the joint negative impact of higher debt service cost and stronger in-
centives for the intertemporal substitution outweigh the rise of the magnitude of
interest exposure channel which implies a drop in dYtdGt in comparison to bench-
mark scenario.
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4.3.2 Debt-financed stimulus
Let us turn to the case in which additional fiscal spending is financed entirely
with public debt. This implies that I have to set λ = 1 + i¯ when simulating the
model. I assume that the debt-repayment schedule is specified as follows:
B¯s+1 (Gt) = B¯ +
(
1+ i¯
) · (Gt − G) f or s = t
B¯s+1 (Gt) = B¯ +
(
1− s−tt′−t
) · (1+ i¯) · (Gt − G) f or t < s ≤ t′
B¯s+1 (Gt) = B¯ f or t′ < s
i.e., after a rise in period t, government debt is repaid linearly until it attains its
stationary equilibrium level in period t′ (I set t′ = 5 in the simulations). This
schedule, together with path:
{Gs (Gt)}s≥t = {Gt, G, G, ...}
pins down the fiscal rule Λ1.
Table 5 reports the results. The fact that government covers a rise in G solely
with debt issuance automatically eliminates the taxation channel which was the
main factor that decreased the multiplier’s value in the benchmark scenario. On
the other hand, however, additional debt has to be repaid in the future which
implies higher taxes in periods s ∈ (t, t′) which translates into a significant drop
in the forward-looking component (i.e., the expectations channel). Its impact on
the multiplier’s size is less pronounced than the effect of the disappearance of
the taxation channel because I consider the model with uninsured idiosyncratic
risk and hand-to-mouth consumers which implies that the Ricardian equivalence
does not hold. This gives rise to a significant amplification of the stimulus when
government purchases are financed with debt: the size of the multiplier almost
doubles.
4.3.3 More persistent fiscal shock
In this subsection, I relax the assumption about the one-time fiscal shock and I
consider an autoregressive path along which government expenditures return to
stationary equilibrium value. The autocorrelation ρG of this process is equal to
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0.8. Therefore, the associated fiscal rule Λ2 can be described as follows:
Λ2 : Gt →
[{
Gt, G + ρG · (Gt − G) , G + ρ2G · (Gt − G) , ...
}
,
{B¯, B¯, ...}] .
This scenario is motivated by Aiyagari et al. (1992) who compared the macroe-
conomic impact of fiscal spending shocks characterized with different degrees of
persistence. In particular, Aiyagari et al. (1992) found that more persistent shocks
exhibit higher multiplier values and the mechanism described in their paper was
the following: higher government spending require higher taxes that impover-
ish households and, as a result, increase their labor supply to compensate this
loss. Therefore, a more persistent shock raises future numbers of hours worked
which, in turn, increases future marginal product of capital and, consequently,
creates larger incentives to invest in the current period. This raises both aggre-
gate demand and the value of multiplier. In my analysis, I reconsider the impact
of fiscal shock persistence in environment where the supply side is passive and
the only source of amplification comes from the demand side and household het-
erogeneity.
Table 5 indicates that the only channel that differs in comparison to baseline
scenario is the one related to consumer expectations. More precisely, persistent
shock tends to decrease its value and, as a result, lowers the multiplier’s value.
This can be explained by the fact that higher government purchases crowd pri-
vate consumption in the model with a one-time shock and therefore, in case of
more persistent stimulus, they are supposed to lower consumption in future pe-
riods. This spurs precautionary motives today (captured by a steeper slope of V
along argument b) and thus crowds out private spending.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents an explicit formula for the government spending multiplier
in the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari model extended to capture frictional product
market. This modification is needed to solve the model with paper and pencil
as it enables to summarize all endogenous general equilibrium effects that affect
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households with only one variable: product market tightness. At the same time,
this departure from the standard framework allows to relax several assumptions
that were made in the literature to obtain analytical expressions in the Bewley-
Huggett-Aiyagari models, such as: i) extreme illiquidity that eliminates wealth
heterogeneity (e.g. Krusell et al. (2011), Werning (2015), Ravn and Sterk (2016),
McKay and Reis (2016a)), ii) constant real interest rates or constant prices of goods
(e.g., Auclert et al. (2018), Patterson (2018)), iii) partial equilibrium analysis (e.g.
Auclert (2017)).
The derived multiplier’s formula has a clear, model-based interpretation and
entails cross-sectional marginal propensities to consume, distributions of con-
sumption, income and wealth among households, parameters of the monetary
policy rule, parameter describing the comovement of output and prices resulting
from a demand shock, aggregate public debt, cross-sectional tax burdens and a
forward-looking component that captures consumer expectations.
I use the model, calibrated to match moments (and distributions) observed
in Italian data, to quantify the channels that determine the multiplier’s value
under four scenarios. First of them (also referred to as benchmark simulation)
assumes that additional fiscal purchases are financed with taxes and monetary
policy follows an unconstrained Taylor rule. Second scenario describes the econ-
omy in which monetary policy becomes less accommodative. Third case is the
debt-financed stimulus and fourth scenario assumes that fiscal policy shock be-
comes more persistent.
My theoretical and quantitative results indicate that household heterogeneity
plays a significant role in the propagation of government expenditures shocks.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma. Suppose that economy is in stationary equilibrium at the beginning of period t
and government follows fiscal rule Λ. Then the value of government spending multiplier
in period t is:
dYt
dGt
=
1+ ∂C
Λ
t
∂Gt
1− ∂CΛt∂xt · 1f ′(xt)
.
Proof. For clarity I omit time subscripts. First, we use the formula for the deriva-
tive of a composite function and the fact that Y = f (see equation 2.15):
dY
dG
=
dY
dx
· dx
dG
=
d f
dx
· dx
dG
.
Next, we apply the Implicit Function Theorem to obtain dxdG from resource con-
straint 2.25 and plug it into equation above and reformulate:
dY
dG
=
d f
dx
· dx
dG
=
d f
dx
·
(
− 1+
∂CΛ
∂G
∂CΛ
∂x − d fdx
)
=
1+ ∂C
Λ
∂G
1− ∂CΛ∂x · 1d f
dx
.
Theorem. Suppose that economy is in stationary equilibrium at the beginning of period
t, condition 2.26 holds, government follows fiscal rule Λ and agents feature perfect fore-
sight about aggregate variables for s > t. Under those assumptions the formula for the
government spending multiplier is:
dYt
dGt
=
1+ ∂C
Λ
t
∂Gt
1− ∂CΛt∂xt · 1f ′(xt)
where:
∂CΛt
∂Gt
≡ −
(
1− λ
1+ i
)
·Eµ (MPC · τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Taxation channel
+ β · (1+ i) ·Eµ
(
MPS · 1
ucc (c)
·VΛbG
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expectations channel
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and:
∂CΛt
∂xt
· 1
f ′ (xt)
≡ − Ω
1+ i
·Eµ (MPS · c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intertemporal substitution channel
+
Ω
1+ i
·Eµ (MPC ·URE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest rate exposure channel
+Eµ (MPC · z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income channel
−
(
Ω
(1+ i)2
− α
)
· B¯ ·Eµ (MPC · τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt service costs channel
−α ·Eµ (MPC · b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fisher channel
where Ω andVΛbG are defined as:
Ω ≡ φΠ · α+ φY.
VΛbG ≡ Ezt+1|ztVΛt+1,bG ((1+ i) ·UREt, zt+1|Gt) |UREt=URE, Gt=G, VΛt+1=V
where variables without time subscripts are evaluated at their stationary equilibrium lev-
els.
Proof. For tractability, let us omit time subscripts in the proof. We will derive
the formulas for ∂C∂x and
∂C
∂G that appear in the general characterization of the
multiplier (equation 3.1) by aggregating individual partial derivatives ∂c∂x and
∂c
∂G .
This method, that is based on the application of the Implicit Function Theorem
to the first order condition 2.27 that holds with equality, can be applied to un-
constrained agents only (i.e. to those with b′ > −ξ). It will be used to obtain
derivatives dcdb′ and
dc
dx , respectively. The case of the constrained agents is consid-
ered at the end of the proof.
Before moving to ∂c∂x and
∂c
∂G , let us make a preliminary step that turns to be very
useful later: notice that the Implicit Function Theorem can be used to derive dcdb′
from the first order condition 2.27 and after rearranging it yields:
uc (c, x) = (1+ i) · β ·Ez′|zVΛb
(
b′, z′|G) =⇒
ucc (c, x) dc = (1+ i) · β ·Ez′|zVΛbb
(
b′, z′|G) db′
Similarly to Auclert (2017), from the definitions of MPC and MPS (see equation
3.2) we obtain:
dc
db′
=
1
1+ i
· MPC
MPS
.
Combining both observations allows to express VΛbb as a function of u
′′, MPC,
46
MPS and i:
Ez′|zVΛbb
(
b′, z′|G) = 1
β · (1+ i)ucc (c, x) ·
dc
db′
=
1
β · (1+ i)2 ·
MPC
MPS
· ucc (c, x) .
(5.1)
Notice that when deriving the formula for dY/dG we will be evaluating VΛbb (b
′, z′|G)
(and other variables) at its stationary equilibrium levels and hence it is equal to
the value of VΛbb (b
′, z′) in stationary equilibrium. This shows that expressions for
MPC and MPS derived here do not depend on changes in aggregate variables
and hence they can be compared to the data in the empirical part of the paper.
I apply the Implicit Function Theorem to 2.27 to get ∂c∂x :
∂c
∂x
=
[
− 1
ucc (c, x) + (1+ i (x))
2 · β ·Ez′ |zVΛbb (b′, z′|G)
]
·
{
ucx (c, x)− i′ (x) · β ·Ez′ |zVΛb
(
b′, z′|G)
− (1+ i (x))2 · β ·Ez′ |zVΛbb
(
b′, z′|G) ·{ 1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}}
.
where I have used the definition of URE (equation 3.3). I use condition 2.26 and I
plug 5.1 into formula for ∂c∂x and rearrange to get:
∂c
∂x
=
− 1
ucc (c, x) + β · (1+ i (x))2 · 1
β·(1+i)2 ·
MPC
MPS · ucc (c, x)
 · {−β · i′ (x) ·Ez′ |zVΛb (b′, z′|G)
−β · (1+ i (x))2 · 1
β · (1+ i)2 ·
MPC
MPS
· ucc (c, x)
·
{
1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}}
=
[
− 1
ucc (c, x) + MPCMPS · ucc (c, x)
]
·
{
−i′ (x) · β ·EΛz′ |zVb
(
b′, z′|G)
−MPC
MPS
· ucc (c, x) ·
{
1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}}
= −
{
MPS
ucc (c, x)
·
(
−i′ (x) · β ·Ez′ |zVΛb
(
b′, z′|G))
−MPC ·
{
1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}}
where I have used the fact that MPC = 1− MPS. We use first order condition
2.27 and the assumed functional form u (formula 3.4 where σ = 1 and φ = 1) to
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simplify the term that contains βEz′|zVΛb (b
′, z′|G):
MPS
ucc (c, x)
·
(
−i′ (x) · β ·Ez′|zVΛb
(
b′, z′|G))
=
MPS
ucc (c, x)
·
(
− i
′ (x) · uc (c, x)
(1+ i(x))
)
= −c ·MPS ·
[
− i
′ (x)
1+ i (x)
]
= c ·MPS ·
[
i′ (x)
1+ i (x)
]
Plugging this result back into ∂c∂x :
∂c
∂x
= −c ·MPS ·
[
i′ (x)
1+ i (x)
]
+MPC ·
{
1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}
.
Since partial derivative of aggregate consumption with respect to market tight-
ness is divided by f ′(x) (common to all agents) in the formula for general multi-
plier (equation 3.1), it is useful to calculate:
∂c
∂x
f ′ (x)
= −c ·MPS ·
 i′(x)f ′(x)
1+ i (x)

+MPC ·
 1(1+ i (x)) · i′ (x)f ′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ∂x (x, G)f ′(x) −
Π′(x)
f ′(x)
Π2 (x)
b + z
 .
To proceed with ∂c∂x / f
′(x) we have to make several observations. From the total
derivation of the Taylor rule:
di = φΠdΠ+ φYdY
=⇒ i′ (x) = φΠΠ′ (x) + φY f ′ (x)
and hence:
i′ (x)
f ′ (x)
= φΠ
dΠ
dx
d f
dx
+ φY = φΠ
dΠ
d f
+ φY
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= φΠ
dΠ
dY
+ φY = φΠ · α(x) + φY
where I have used the definition of α 3.5 and the fact that f = Y. Similarly:
Π′
f ′
= α.
Let us define:
Ω ≡ φΠ · α+ φY = i
′ (x)
f ′ (x)
.
Moreover, from the government budget constraint 2.22, from the assumed value
of price index in stationary equilibrium Π = 1 and from the results about i
′(x)
f ′(x)
and Π
′(x)
f ′(x) derived above:
∂Θ
∂x (x, G)
f ′(x)
=
1
f ′(x)
(
∂
∂x
(
1
Π (x)
− 1
1+ i (x)
)
· B¯
)
=
1
f ′(x)
(
−Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
+
i′(x)
(1+ i (x))2
)
· B¯
=
(
−α+ Ω
(1+ i (x))2
)
· B¯.
All these means that ∂c∂x / f
′(x) can be rewritten as:
∂c
∂x
f ′ (x)
= −c ·MPS ·
 i′(x)f ′(x)
1+ i (x)

+MPC ·
{
1
(1+ i (x))
·Ω ·URE + τ (z)
(
α− Ω
(1+ i (x))2
)
· B¯− α · b + z
}
. (5.2)
Aggregation over all agents yields:
∂C
∂x
f ′ (x)
=
[
− Ω
1+ i (x)
]
·Eµ (MPS · c)
+
1
(1+ i (x))
·Ω ·Eµ (MPC ·URE)−
(
Ω
(1+ i (x))2
− α
)
· B¯ ·Eµ (MPC · τ)
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−αEµ (MPC · b) +Eµ (MPC · z)
which is what we wanted to show.
To get the formula for ∂C∂G , we need to compute
∂c
∂G and then we need to aggre-
gate it across all agents. The formed is obtained (analogously to ∂c∂x ) by applying
the Implicit Function Theorem to 2.27:
∂c
∂G
= −
[
1
ucc (c, x) + (1+ i (x))
2 · β ·Ez′|zVΛbb (b′, z′|G)
]
(
(1+ i (x))2 · β ·Ez′|zVΛbb
(
b′, z′|G) · τ (z) · ∂Θ
∂G
(x, G)
− (1+ i (x)) · β ·Ez′|zVΛbG
(
b′, z′|G)) .
We now apply the relationship between VΛbb and ucc given by equation 5.1:
∂c
∂G
= −
 1
ucc (c, x) + β · (1+ i (x))2 · 1
β·(1+i)2 ·
MPC
MPS · ucc (c, x)

·
(
β · (1+ i (x))2 · 1
β · (1+ i)2 ·
MPC
MPS
· ucc (c, x) · τ (z) · ∂Θ
∂G
(x, G)
− (1+ i (x)) · β ·Ez′|zVΛbG
(
b′, z′|G))
= −
(
1− λ
1+ i
)
·MPC · τ (z) + MPS
ucc (c)
· (1+ i (x)) · β ·Ez′|zVΛbG
(
b′, z′|G) (5.3)
where I have used the fact that MPS = 1−MPC, the fact that ucc becomes inde-
pendent of x under assumed preferences and the fact that from 2.22 we obtain:
∂Θ
∂G
(x, G) = 1− λ
1+ i
.
Aggregation of 5.3 over all agents yields the formula for ∂C∂G .
Let us consider constrained agents now. Observe, that for those households
we have MPC = 1 and MPS = 0 by the definition. I will argue, that formulas
from Theorem 2 continue to apply for consumers with b′ = −ξ if we plug MPC =
1 and MPS = 0. Individual consumption is determined directly from the budget
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constraint:
c =
b
Π (x)
+ z · f (x)− τ ·Θ (x, G) + ξ
1+ i (x)
.
Thus, the partial derivative ∂c∂x divided by f
′ (x) reads:
∂c
∂x
f ′ (x)
=
− b·Π′(x)Π2(x) + z f ′ (x)− τ ·
[
−Π′(x)Π2(x) +
i′(x)
(1+i(x))2
]
· B¯ +URE · i′(x)
(1+i(x))2
f ′(x)
where I have used the fact that b′ = URE (see equation 3.3). Simplifying and
using the fact that in stationary equilibrium Π = 1:
∂c
∂x
f ′ (x)
= −b · α (x) + z + τ ·
[
α (x)− Ω (x)
(1+ i (x))2
]
· B¯ +URE · Ω (x)
(1+ i (x))2
which is identical to formula 5.2 for the unconstrained agents if we plugged
MPC = 1 and MPS = 0. Similarly, for constrained agents:
∂c
∂G
= −τ · ∂Θ
∂G
= −τ ·
(
1− λ
1+ i
)
which is identical to formula 5.3 when MPC = 1. All this means that formulas
for ∂c∂x and
∂c
∂G for constrained agents are special cases of formulas for the un-
constrained agents and thus formulas from Theorem 2 capture the case of con-
strained agents, too.
Multiplier formula when ucx 6= 0
In this part, I present the formula for the multiplier when condition 2.26 is re-
laxed. This gives rise to an additional, “mechanical” channel through which fiscal
purchases affect private consumption.
I proceed analogously to the proof of Theorem. It is easy to see that the only
modification that has to be introduced is associated with term ∂C∂x . First, I apply
the Implicit Function Theorem to 2.27 to get ∂c∂x :
∂c
∂x
=
[
− 1
ucc (c, x) + (1+ i (x))
2 · β ·Ez′ |zVΛbb (b′, z′|G)
]
·
{
ucx (c, x)− i′ (x) · β ·Ez′ |zVΛb
(
b′, z′|G)
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− (1+ i (x))2 · β ·Ez′ |zVΛbb
(
b′, z′|G) ·{ 1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}}
.
I plug 5.1 into formula for ∂c∂x and rearrange to get:
∂c
∂x
=
− 1
ucc (c, x) + β · (1+ i (x))2 · 1
β·(1+i)2 ·
MPC
MPS · ucc (c, x)
 ·{ucx (c, x)− β · i′ (x) ·Ez′ |zVΛb (b′, z′|G)
−β · (1+ i (x))2 · 1
β · (1+ i)2 ·
MPC
MPS
· ucc (c, x)
·
{
1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}}
=
[
− 1
ucc (c, x) + MPCMPS · ucc (c, x)
]
·
{
ucx (c, x)− i′ (x) · β ·EΛz′ |zVb
(
b′, z′|G)
−MPC
MPS
· ucc (c, x) ·
{
1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}}
= −
{
MPS
ucc (c, x)
·
(
ucx (c, x)− i′ (x) · β ·Ez′ |zVΛb
(
b′, z′|G))
−MPC ·
{
1
(1+ i (x))
· i′ (x) ·URE− τ (z) ∂Θ
∂x
(x, G)− Π
′ (x)
Π2 (x)
b + z · f ′ (x)
}}
.
Let us concentrate on the following functional form that represents preferences:26
u (c, x) =
1
1− σ ·
(
c ·
(
1− κ
q (x)
))1−σ
where σ > 0 and σ 6= 1. This implies that:
ucc (c, x) = −σ ·
(
c ·
(
1− κ
q (x)
))−σ−1
·
(
1− κ
q (x)
)2
and:
ucx (c, x) =
(
c ·
(
1− κ
q (x)
))−σ
· κ · q
′ (x)
q2 (x)
· (1− σ)
26I impose φ = 1 on 3.4 to obtain the characterization of the “mechanical” channel which is a
product of two terms: aggregate component that is equal across all households and aggregated
cross-products of individual variables. This formulation allows for better interpretability and
enables to express that channel in a similar way to other channels.
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This means that:
ucx (c, x)
ucc (c, x)
=
(
− c
σ
)
· (1− σ) · κ
q (x)− κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Υ(x)
·q
′ (x)
q (x)
.
Plugging this result into derivations from the proof of Theorem, leads to the fol-
lowing formula for ∂C∂x / f
′ (x):
∂C
∂x
f ′ (x)
=
[
(1− σ) · Υ(x)
q (x)
· q
′ (x)
f ′ (x)
− Ω
1+ i (x)
]
· 1
σ
·Eµ (MPS · c)
+
1
(1+ i (x))
·Ω ·Eµ (MPC ·URE)−
(
Ω
(1+ i (x))2
− α
)
· B¯ ·Eµ (MPC · τ)
−αEµ (MPC · b) +Eµ (MPC · z) .
Given the general formula for the multiplier 3.1 and that f ′ > 0, q′ < 0 and q (x) > κ
(and hence Υ > 0) leads to conclusion that the additional, “mechanical” channel
described with:
(1− σ) · Υ(x)
q (x)
· q
′ (x)
f ′ (x)
· 1
σ
·Eµ (MPS · c)
crowds private consumption out when σ > 1 and it crowds it in when σ ∈ (0, 1).
Calibration of parameter α with the SVAR model
Recall that the value of α is defined as:
α ≡
dΠ
dx
dY
dx
and, because x can be thought of as a measure of aggregate demand, α can be
interpreted as a measure of comovement of prices and output which results from
a positive demand shock. To find an empirical measure of α I use the standard
SVAR model (that consists of two variables: output and prices and four lags cho-
sen with standard tests). I estimate the model using quarterly data for Italy from
1985 to 2018 (I take first differences to obtain data used in estimation).
To identify demand shocks I use sign restrictions (it is assumed that a posi-
53
tive demand shock increases both price level and output while a positive supply
shock raises output and lowers prices). Parameter α is approximated with the
ratio between the value of the impulse response function of price index and the
value of the impulse response function of output in period 0. Impulse response
functions are reported in Figure 5.1 (I report the median value of all IRFs satisfy-
ing the sign restriction at a given date).
Figure 5.1: SVAR simulation: the impact of demand shock on output and prices
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1
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Impulse response functions
Figure 5.2: Impulse response functions: baseline scenario, model with HTM
agents
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Figure 5.3: Impulse response functions: baseline scenario, model with HTM
agents
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Figure 5.4: Impulse response functions: baseline scenario, model with discount
factor heterogeneity
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Figure 5.5: Impulse response functions: more active monetary policy, model with
HTM agents
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Figure 5.6: Impulse response functions: debt-financed stimulus, model with
HTM agents
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Figure 5.7: Impulse response functions: more persistent shock, model with HTM
agents
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